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I. SURVEYING THE DEPLOYMENT
N THE SUMMER OF 2003, The Economist ran a column criti-
wcizing the use by the United States of military commissions to deal
with individuals detained in the wake of 9/11. As the text of the
headline ("Unjust, unwise, unAmerican") on the cover of the magazine
made plain, the authors objected to employing an ad hoc process instead
'Judith Resnik and Dennis E. Curtis, Copyright 2007. This paper, the Henry LaBarre
Jayne Lecture, was read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Society on 12 No-
vember 2005. We present some of the thesis of our forthcoming book to be published by Yale
University Press in 2007 or shortly thereafter.
Thanks are due to more people than can be acknowledged here. The deans of Yale Law
School (where we now teach) and of the University of Southern California (where we taught
before) have been warmly supportive of our interests. We have benefited from the help of
many judges, justices, and architects who assisted us in venues around the world and from
staff, librarians, and curators who provided resources and information at diverse locations.
Our understanding of the architectural questions has been informed by Diane Jones, who
shaped a transnational conference on courthouse architecture, and by Jane Loeffler, Richard
Gilyard, and Celeste Bremer, all of whom provided us with insights on the American side.
Joel Cohen guided our chartmaking so as to clarify the graphics. Kathryn Slanski, expert on
Yale's Babylonian Collection, shared her expertise with us.
Special help came from a group of current and former students from Yale College and
Yale Law School, including Laurie Ball, Elizabeth Brundige, Maria Burnett, Naima Farrell,
Laura Heiman, Hannah Hubler, Chavi Keeney Nana, Phu Nguyen, Natalie Ram, Bertrall
Ross, and Alana Tucker. Their research has enabled us to make accessible the images and
graphics reproduced for this lecture. Additionally, we thank Yale staff, including the director
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of a regular court system to try
alleged terrorists.2 But the editors
hoped that readers would quickly
understand that critique by looking at
the visual accusation-a blindfolded
woman draped in Grecian robes and
holding scales and sword-viewed
through the sights of a rifle. The artist
turned Justice into the target rather
than the goal.
Our first question is why the pub-
lishers of The Economist had the con-
fidence to market their product inter-
nationally by relying on such a picture
for the cover. They were not, after all,
selling their magazine only to people
familiar with this remnant of Renais-
sance iconography. Why did the edi-
tors assume that viewers would con-
nect the image to justice, gone awry,
rather than to warrior princesses, the
Roman Empire, or operas?
Our project is (in part) to answer
FIGURE 1. Justicia [IUSTITIA]. that question. And the response (in
Walter S. Allward, 1946, Supreme part) is that The Economist is not
Court of Canada, Ottawa, Canada. alone in appropriating the icon of
Photographer: Philippe Landreville.Copyright: Supreme Court of Canada. Justice. One can find her everywhere,
marking both places and objects as
law-related. One such example (fig. 1)
comes from the front of the Canadian Supreme Court in Ottawa.
Travel thousands of miles to Australia to see Justices at many court
buildings, including those in a Queensland court complex in Brisbane,
and in Melbourne where a large metal sculpture on the side of the Vic-
toria County Court (fig. 2) is readily seen from a busy street. Justices
also sit outside in front of courts in Lusaka, Zambia, and in Brasilia,
of technical services, Susan Monsen, law librarians Gene Coakley and Camilla Tubbs, and
Marilyn Cassella.
We began this project many years ago at the Photographic Collection of the University of
London's Warburg Institute. We are deeply appreciative of the intellectual generosity of Jen-
nifer Montagu and Elizabeth McGrath, of the Warburg Institute, who welcomed us and re-
sponded to our many questions. A first iteration can be found in Dennis E. Curtis and Judith
Resnik, "Images of Justice," 96 Yale Law Journal 1727 (1987).
2 The Economist, 12 July 2003, at 9.
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FIGURE 2. Lady of Justice. William Eicholtz, 2002, Victoria County Court, Mel-
bourne, Australia. Photographer: Ken Irwin. Reproduced by permission of the sculptor and
of the Liberty Group, owner and manager of the Victoria County Court Facility.
Brazil, and other Justices sit inside, at the Supreme Court of Japan and
the Supreme Court building in Azerbaijan. In addition, a photograph
that ran in April of 2003 in the New York Times with the caption "Sad-
dam Hussein with the Scales of Justice" made another point: leaders
from around the world drape themselves in Justice's accoutrements. 3
In short, from Europe to Iraq, from North and South America to
Africa, Australia, and Asia, producers of images rely on our capacity
to recognize Justice. Further, and illustrated by magazine covers such
as that of The Economist, Justice has other functions. In addition to
adorning government buildings, she is also a stock figure in commerce,
appearing on catalogues to sell books to lawyers and as jewelry. Fur-
ther attesting to her ready recognizability is her incarnation in cartoons,
3 The accompanying article, "U.S. Seeks Solid Core to Fix Iraq's Broken Legal System,"
by Bernard Weinraub, ran on 27 April 2003 at A24.
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FIGURE 3. Don't Worry, She's Blind. Jeff Danziger, 2003. Copyright: Jeff Danziger,
NY Times Syndicate. Reproduced courtesy of the artist.
as can be seen from a 2004 cartoon (fig. 3)4 criticizing a decision by
one Supreme Court Justice to vote in a case involving a party with
whom he had spent time duck-hunting.
These images have, we hope, sufficed to anchor a first point. Through-
out the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, we can see Justice
"4This cartoon ran in March of 2004 in the New York Times. At the time, Justice Antonin
Scalia had declined a request that he recuse himself from a case pending before the Court.
The underlying lawsuit, Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
related to the decision by Vice President Cheney and other government officials to convene
a National Energy Policy Development Group but not to comply with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, requiring open meetings and disclosure of information. The lower court had
directed that the defendant government officials, including Vice President Cheney, provide
information about the task force and its recommendations.
The government defendants asked the appellate court to prevent the district court's order
from having effect. Losing that appeal, the government defendants won at the Supreme
Court, which sent the case back to the appellate court to reconsider whether separation-of-
powers doctrine protected the defendant officials from disclosing information about the
meetings. Justice Scalia joined that majority. See Cheney v. United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
While the case was ongoing, Vice President Cheney and Justice Scalia continued their
practice of duck-hunting together. The Sierra Club requested that the Justice recuse himself
because his connection to one party raised an appearance of a lack of impartiality. The
Justice, responding to that motion, declined to withdraw. See Cheney v. United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (18 March 2004) (Scalia, J.).
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imagery used on government buildings, in advertisements, and in jest.
All of these deployments rely on the fact that we can "read" the oddly
dressed woman with a set of attributes (scales, sword, and sometimes a
blindfold) as representing or referring to Justice.
2. THE VISUAL TRADITION
A. Extricating Justice from Her Companion Virtues
As those steeped in European history know, the Justice easily identified
today dates from the medieval and Renaissance periods. This sixteenth-
century engraving by Cornelis Matsys (fig. 4) shows one such Justice,
and thousands of comparable classical images line museum and build-
ing walls.
Turn then to another engraving (fig. 5), also by Matsys, with two
figures. One is, again, Justice. The other woman is looking in a mirror.
Some will recognize her as Prudence, but most of the people walking into
courthouses and most of the consumers buying magazines would not
know who she is. Yet, in medieval and Renaissance imagery, Justice was
not a solo actor but one of four Cardinal Virtues-Prudence, Fortitude,
FIGURE 4. IUSTICIA.
Cornelis Matsys, circa 1543-44.
Copyright: Warburg Institute. 9NA:
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FIGURE 5. Justice and Prudence. Cornelis Matsys, circa 1538.
Copyright: Warburg Institute.
Temperance, and Justice. That foursome was often joined in paintings
by the three theological Virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity.
Where does the iconography of Justice come from? The particular
attributes that became associated with Justice harken back to the Baby-
lonian iconography of the god Shamash and to the Egyptian goddess
Maat. Along with other Egyptian deities including Thoth and Osiris,
Maat (in a female form) has been found on papyri illustrating what is
commonly called the Book of the Dead. In these scenes, the heart of an
individual sits on one side of a balance. On the other side is a feather,
itself another symbol of Maat, whose cosmological importance was to
denote a state of order, stability, truth, justice, or well-being. Perhaps
influenced by subsequent developments of theological beliefs in other
religions, many interpreters of the balance scene assume that it marks
the judgment of a person at death.
From there, one can trace Justice's roots through goddesses both
Greek and Roman, from Themis and Dike to lustitia. The iconograph-
ical trail continues through the portrayal of the archangel St. Michael,
often shown weighing souls or brandishing a sword to ward off the
144
REPRESENTING JUSTICE
dragon of Satan. By the Middle Ages, Justice (holding sword and
scales, a la St. Michael) became one of several Virtues identified in pre-
sentations of the Psychomachia, the epic battle of Virtues and Vices for
a person's soul.
Each Virtue has its own substantial literature and theory, as well as
signature attributes5 (greatly simplified in this brief overview) to distin-
guish one draped female form from another.6 In addition to Prudence,
shown in figure 5 with a mirror described as denoting self-awareness,
consider a Temperance (fig. 6) of the early sixteenth century, modeled
by Agostino Veneziano after a Raphael fresco in the Vatican. 7 Her bri-
dle symbolizes self-restraint, whereas the Fortitude (fig. 7) by Marcan-
tonio Raimondi has armor and a lion, evoking endurance and strength.
These reproductions anchor our second point: that the remarkable
longevity of Justice is not shared by her sibling virtues. The visual ac-
cessibility of Justice stands in contrast to the relative inscrutability of
other Renaissance images. The obvious question is why, and its answer
brings us to a third proposition: that we know the image of Justice be-
cause it has been deployed, politically, by governments seeking to link
their rules and judgments to her legitimacy. Sovereigns-be they em-
perors, kings, queens, dukes, burghers, presidents, prime ministers, or
dictators-have wrapped themselves, deliberately and visibly, in Jus-
tice. She has had a remarkable run as political propaganda.
B. Tracing Justice's Political Roots
We skip the earliest periods and pick up with the late Middle Ages,
when European town leaders constructed new public civic spaces-town
5 See, e.g., Helen North, From Myth to Icon: Reflections on Greek Ethical Doctrine in
Literature and Art (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979).
6 That Virtues are shown as females stems from their roots in Egyptian, Greek, and
Roman goddesses and from the linguistic feminine case of abstract nouns in Romance
languages. See Marina Warner, Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form,
63-87 (New York: Atheneum, 1985). In the 405 CE epic poem, the Psychomachia by
Prudentius, which served as a source for portrayals of scenes of combat between good and
evil, both the Virtues and Vices were described as female. By the twelfth century, however,
certain Vices such as Avarice were given a male form, whereas Unchastity was portrayed as
female. See Henry Kraus, "Eve and Mary: Conflicting Images of Medieval Woman," in
Feminism and Art History: Questioning the Litany, 77-99 (Norma Broude and Mary D.
Garrard, eds., New York: Harper & Row, 1982).
7 Many commentators have identified the Raphael frescoes, painted between 1508 and
1511 in the Stanza della Segnatura, as including the Cardinal Virtues, three of whom are seen
in one sequence with a lunette of Justice above. See, e.g., Edgar Wind, "Platonic Justice,
Designed by Raphael," 1 J. Warburg Institute 68 (1937). In contrast, Christiane L. Joost-
Gaugier believes them to be the Three Graces. See Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier, Raphael's
Stanza della Segnatura: Meaning and Invention, 132-46 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
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FIGURE 6. Temperance. Agostino Veneziano, 1517. Copyright: Warburg Institute.
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halls, which were multi-function buildings that augmented churches
and market squares as places of assembly and of commerce. From the
buildings that remain,8 one can see that town leaders sought to en-
shrine their own authority by using scenes of the Last Judgment and of
various Virtues and allegories on the walls about them. Over time, how-
ever, the image of Justice comes to the fore.
One spectacular and much discussed example of such art is in Siena,
in the Palazzo Pubblico, its town hall. The fresco (fig. 8), sometimes
called The Allegory of Good Government, dates from about 1340 and
is by Ambrogio Lorenzetti. The scene, awash with figures and inscrip-
tions, has at its center an older, bearded male figure, who holds a scep-
ter and a shield and who resembles a mixture of Jesus and an emperor.
Sitting on a throne, he is said either to represent the "Common Good"
or to be an incarnation of "the Nine," the number of citizens serving
for revolving short terms on the ruling council of the Republic of Siena,
which endured for about seventy years until 1355.
In the Lorenzetti fresco, various figures, all labeled in Latin, sur-
round the central figure. Included are Fortitude, Prudence, Temperance,
and Justice. But in contrast to the other figures, only Justice appears twice
and is named seven times in the inscribed texts. 9 One of these Justices
is on the bench with the other Virtues; she is shown both at their level
and of their size. Looking forward and crowned, she might be a "Vin-
dictive Justice." She displays a sword, pointing upward; a severed head
lies on her knee. Below her are soldiers on horses and a group of scruffy-
looking people, sometimes described as prisoners.
The second Justice is at the other end of the scene. Unlike all the
other named Virtues, she is significantly larger and sits, like the central
male figure, on a throne of her own. Above her head is a figure labeled
(in Latin) Wisdom and below her is Concord. Cords thread from the
pans of this Justice's scales to Concord, then on to a group of twenty-
four well-dressed people (representing either the former governing coun-
cil of Siena, upright citizens, or the Elders sitting on Judgment Day).
From their hands, the cords run to the hand of the enthroned Common
Good/Nine figure.
The virtuous court in The Allegory of Good Government inhabits
a light-filled scene of a thriving locality, with builders, dancers, cobblers,
8Given the range of cities, the various economic capacities, and the deterioration,
recycling, and renovations of such structures, we generalize only with the caveat that much
that existed no longer can be seen.
9Randolph Starn and Loren Partridge, Arts of Power: Three Halls of State in Italy, 1300-
1600, at 48-54 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Randolph Starn, "The

























and a rolling landscape. In visual opposition is another fresco, often
called The Allegory of Bad Government, in which a horned, fanged cen-
tral figure labeled "Tyranny" sits in a bleak landscape. Surrounded by
various Vices, he subjugates yet another Justice, who is disheveled, tied
up, and bound at his feet. Nearby lie two pans severed from a scale.
Political philosophers and art historians have debated the multiple
messages of the Lorenzetti frescoes; some argue that they demonstrate
an embrace of Aristotle (via St. Thomas Aquinas), and are thereby atten-
tive to distributive and commutative justice, while others trace their
sources to Cicero, committed to the wise use of power by leaders.' 0
Although disagreeing about what political theory was there embodied,
these commentators share the view that the secular leaders who com-
missioned these frescoes wanted to impress upon viewers that the pros-
perity and security they enabled stemmed from Justice, with divine Wis-
dom's blessing from above.
The contemporary currency of these frescoes, preaching the cen-
trality of Justice to governance, can be seen by jumping hundreds of
years ahead, to the United States in the twentieth century. Two artists,
Caleb Ives Bach and Dorothea Rockburne, commissioned during the
1980s and 1990s to provide art for federal courthouses in Seattle,
Washington, and in Portland, Maine, drew upon Lorenzetti. Bach named
his densely painted large flat canvases Allegories of Good and Bad Gov-
ernment (fig. 9), and Rockburne's abstraction bears the title The Virtues
of Good Government (fig. 10).
Returning to the Europe of centuries ago, another central Renais-
sance building, the Vatican, also offered a deliberate didactic program
of frescoes-this one understood as insisting that Greek and Roman
philosophical traditions could be unified under the pope, the rightful
representative on earth of the divinity of the Christian God in heaven.
In the Stanza della Segnatura, Raphael put a Justice, along with Poetry,
Theology, and Philosophy, on the ceiling above the grouping discussed
earlier of Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude.
Justices can be found in other Vatican rooms, including one paint-
ing by Giulio Romano, who portrayed a large woman looking at a scale
and with her hand on a large ostrich, almost her size. The ostrich, one of
several Justice attributes that have not been passed down to contempo-
rary viewers, was-according to the famous Renaissance iconographical
l0Compare Quentin Skinner's two essays ("Ambrogio Lorenzetti's Buon Governo
Frescoes: Two Old Questions, Two New Answers," 62 J. Warburg and Courtauld Institutes
1 119991, and "Ambrogio Lorenzetti: The Artist as Political Philosopher," 72 Proceedings of
the British Academy 1 [1986]) with that of Nicolai Rubinstein, "Political Ideas in Sienese
Art: The Frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti and Taddeo di Bartolo in the Palazzo Pubblico,"
21] J. Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 179 (1958).
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FIGURE 9. Allegories of Good and Bad Government. Caleb Ives Bach, 1985, in the
interior of the William Kenzo Nakamura Federal Courthouse, Seattle, Washington. Photo-
graph courtesy of the General Services Administration of the United States and reproduced
with the permission of the artist.
FIGURE 10. The Virtues of Good Government. Dorothea Rockburne, 1996, in the
renovation of the Edward T. Gignoux United States Courthouse, Portland, Maine, com-
pleted by Leers Winsapfel Associates in 1996. Photographer: Don Johnson. Copyright:
Dorothea Rockburne/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York, 2006; Donald E. Johnson,
donjohnsonphoto.com, 2006. Reproduced with the assistance and permission of the artist,
the photographer, and the General Services Administration.
FIGURE 11. Justice.
John van Nost the Younger,
1753, in the Great Courtyard,
Dublin Castle, Ireland.
Photographers: Dennis Curtis
and Judith Resnik. Reproduced
with their permission.
compendium by Cesare Ripa-appropriate. 11 The ostrich supposedly
had feathers of equal length and, hence, provided a reference to law's
obligation of equal treatment of all disputants. Further, ostriches were
reputed to be able to digest everything. One translation of Ripa's Ico-
nologia made this connection: "The ostrich ruminates its food as Justice
should testimony put before her." 12 Moreover, the feather representing
the Egyptian concept of Maat was said to have come from an ostrich.
Romano's painting may well be referencing that tradition.
Moving north from Rome to Venice, today's visitors can see that the
Doges of Venice embraced the iconography of Justice. Statues of her are
in prominent display in many sites. Moreover, as is documented by Cana-
letto paintings of the mid-eighteenth century (such as the 1750 Regatta
on the Grand Canal), Venice had a yearly ceremony featuring the Doges'
official barge, the Bucintoro. At its bow sat a large gilded Justice.
Further north, the coats of arms for various Swiss and German
burghers featured Justice. Across the channel in England, a 1704 Verrio
painting, now hanging in Hampton Court Palace, showed Queen Anne
as Justice. Later in that century, Ireland's rulers put Justice on top of
Dublin's courts, originally completed in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century and restored during the twentieth century. The photo-
graph (fig. 11) shows her visage from the inner courtyard, but she is
I I First published (without images) in 1593, and then in 1603 with images, Cesare Ripa's
lconologia was republished many times in many languages and with various illustrations.
'
2See Beryl Rowland, Birds with Human Souls: A Guide to Bird Symbolism, 111-15
(Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1978) (citing an English translation of Ripa
by George Richardson).
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FIGURE 12. Themis, Goddess of Justice. Jack Harman, 1982, Vancouver Law Courts,
British Columbia, Canada. Copyright: Harman Sculpture Foundry Ltd., Alberta, Canada,
and the Law Courts Education Society of British Columbia. Reproduced courtesy of the
copyright holders.
placed with her back to the city's streets, a gesture some explain as a
protest against English rule.
The English Parliament, in turn, also deployed a Justice, who is
dated from 1907, and is placed atop Old Bailey (now London's central
criminal court). To complete this fast, chronological roots tour by land-
ing in the present, figure 12 is called Themis, Goddess of Justice and sits
inside the Vancouver Law Courts, a 1979 building in Western Canada.13
In sum, even in eras such as ours, so influenced by semiotic inter-
pretations and postmodern skepticism, this remnant of Renaissance
iconography continues to be placed in courthouses. Moreover, contem-
13 According to the City of Vancouver's Public Art Registry, the sculptor relied in part on
images of the goddess Diana, who is often seen holding a sword but here has a scroll instead.
Because "the artist . . . was against capital punishment, [he] replaced the sword with a
scroll." City of Vancouver, Public Art Registry, Themis, Goddess of Justice, http://www.
city. vancouver. bc.ca/pu blicart_wac/pu blicart.exe/i ndiv-artwork?pnRegistry-No = 137.
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porary viewers understand the message. We, like generations before us,
have been taught it, repeatedly, by our governments, which have linked
themselves to Justice. Yet government leaders did not insist that we also
intuit their connections to Justice's Renaissance siblings, Fortitude,
Prudence, and Temperance.
C. The Risks and Difficulties of Doing Justice
Today's governments have not only failed to teach about a wider array
of virtues; they have also generally avoided reproducing the many his-
torical paintings and sculptures that told less upbeat justice stories. To
help recover them, consider first the myth of Cambyses, a story that
was translated with regularity in medieval texts and then depicted visu-
ally in the Renaissance.
According to Herodotus, some 525 years before the Common Era
King Cambyses ruled Persia and ordered a corrupt judge, Sisamnes,
flayed alive. Cambyses then appointed Otanes, who was the son of the
corrupt judge, to replace his father and forced the new judge, the son,
to sit on a seat made from the skin of his father. Dozens of prints of
this scene exist but the point is made vividly in an important painting
of this story by the Flemish artist Gerard David, who undertook the
commission in the late 1400s for the city hall of Bruges, in what is now
Belgium. The visual translation of this story begins in the left-hand
panel of the diptych (fig. 13). In the back, behind the arches, one can
see a judge (in a red robe) accepting a bag of money. In the center,
Cambyses (dressed like a German king) is accusing the judge, who is
arrested. In the right-hand panel (fig. 14), the corrupt judge is being
flayed alive. In a smaller scene at the back is the denouement. The new
judge-the son-is seated on his father's skin, which has been turned
into a judge's bench.
Competing interpretations exist about the import of the Cambyses
story. One version of the legend posits that Cambyses was insane, a
person left in a perpetual state of rage and drunkenness who commit-
ted many atrocious acts, such as killing his siblings and ordering the
flaying of the judge. The dominant medieval/Renaissance interpretation,
however, was that the Cambyses story exemplified a king who wisely
(if vividly) sanctioned an unjust judge. The picture thus serves as a
warning to all judges to behave appropriately.14
14 Supporting this approach are the texts appearing under medals depicting the story, such
as one that states, "Cambyses the King maintained law and administered it justly, as one can
perceive here from the punishment." See Edward Gans and Guido Kisch, "The Cambyses
































Efforts to inspire fear in judges can also be found elsewhere, such
as a fresco, called Les Juges aux Mains Couples (Judges with their
Hands Cut Off), dating from 1604 and hung in the Town Hall of
Geneva, then a republic. One possible source is Plutarch's reference to
judges in Thebes who, without hands, could not take bribes."5 On the
fresco itself sits another text, displayed on a scroll, from Exodus 23:8,
which can be translated as "Thou shall not accept gifts, for a present
blinds the prudent and distorts the words of the just." 1 6
But, according to Natalie Zemon Davis, writing The Gift in Sixteenth-
Century France, "gifts were everywhere" because it was customary to
honor holders of offices by giving presents. 17 The line between a "good
gift" and a "bad one""S-that is, what today we call a bribe-was not
clear then (nor always so today). Further, as Davis argues, the French
prohibition that banned gifts to judges was "as much related to the
king's efforts to control his judicial officers and win their loyalty as it
was to popular complaint." 19 Thus, Cambyses and Les Juges aux Mains
Couples can be seen as warnings against corruption. Alternatively, these
images could be understood to have been efforts to instill the concept
that certain kinds of gifts were in fact a form of corruption and they
can be read as efforts to control those who held the power of judgment
by instilling the fear of a ruling power's wrath.
Important narratives come from other allegorical depictions found
in many European town halls. The Amsterdam Town Hall, inaugu-
rated in 1655 and now called the Royal Palace, 20 is a source that, like
the Siena Town Hall, was famous in its day and remains available to
contemporary spectators. From the rich literature about this edifice,
we know that the city governors wanted their building and its interi-
ors to tell of Amsterdam's prosperity and power. And like those who
commissioned the works in Siena, the governing body linked its rule to
Justice.
1- "In Thebes there were set up statues of judges without hands, and the statue of the chief
justice had its eyes closed, to indicate that justice is not influenced by gifts or by intercession."
See Plutarch's Moralia, Isis and Osiris v. 5, 27 (E. H. Warmington, ed., Frank Cole Babbitt,
trans.; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1969).
16 Some translate this text slightly differently, as "And thou shall take no gift; for the gift
blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous."
17Natalie Davis, The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France, 85 (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 2000).
18Id. at 85.
19Id. at 87.20The building became a palace in 1808 under King Louis Napoleon, the brother of
Emperor Napoleon. See generally Katharine Fremantle, The Baroque Town Hall of Amster-
dam (Utrecht: Hanetjens Kekker & Gumbert, 1959); Eymert-Jan Goossens, Treasure Wrought
by Chisel and Brush: The Town Hall of Amsterdam in the Golden Age (Zolle, Netherlands:
Waanders Publishers and the Royal Palace Foundation, 1996).
155
JUDITH RESNIK AND DENNIS E. CURTIS
i.i,j1
FIGURE 15. Prudence and Justice. Attributed to Artus Quillinus, front pediment
(looking toward Dam Square) of the Town Hall (Royal Palace) of Amsterdam, the Nether-
lands. Photographs courtesy of and reproduced with permission of the Amsterdam City
Archives.
The Town Hall's facade makes that announcement first. On the
side facing Dam Square, three large statues adorn the roof. Figure 15
offers a close-up of Justice on one side of Peace, who sits at the center,
while Prudence can be found at the other side of the roof. Once inside,
Justice appears several times, including in a large sculpture with atten-
dants that marks the entrance to the Magistrates' Chambers. Inside that
room, she appears again in a 1662 painting, called Prudence, Justice,
and Peace, by Jurgens Ovens.
Downstairs, on the ground floor, is the Tribunal, the Vierschaar
(fig. 16), which is a relatively small marble room in which judgments
were pronounced. The interior is visible from above, apparently so that
the burgomasters could "give their sanction to the sentencing of the
prisoner."' 21 Further, the room is open through windows to the street;









FIGURE 16. Interior of the Tribunal (or Vierschaar). Ground floor of the Town
Hall (Royal Palace) of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Photograph courtesy of and repro-
duced with permission of the Amsterdam City Archives.
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FIGURE 17. West wall of the Tribunal (Vierschaar). Town Hall (Royal Palace) of
Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Wall sculpture attributed to Artus Quillinus, circa 1655.
Copyright: Royal Palace Foundation of Amsterdam.
passersby could look in to watch. When they did so, they would see the
wall (fig. 17)22 behind the judges-and thus its three sculpted panels,
the Blinding of King Zaleucus, the Judgment of Solomon, and the Judg-
ment of Brutus.
The Judgment of Solomon is familiar. Depictions of this scene were
featured in town halls across Europe. The story is a reminder that divin-
ing the truth is hard when competing claims of right are presented and
requires knowledge of daily practices and of human emotions. More
challenging for those with the burden of judgment are the lessons to be
learned from the stories of Zaleucus and Brutus. Like the Solomon
story, they center around parent-child relationships, but with a very
different punch line. The Judgment of Solomon relies on the idea that a
22 Our thanks to Professor Eymert-Jan Goossens for helping us to obtain this image and
permission for its reproduction.
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mother would not permit harm to befall her child, whereas both of the
fathers-Zaleucus and Brutus-do harm to their children as proof of
their commitment to law.
Zaleucus was supposed to have been a "law-giver" in a Greek col-
ony in Southern Italy in the seventh century before the Common Era.
He issued an edict that anyone found to have committed adultery was
to be blinded. After his son was found guilty of that crime, Zaleucus,
unyielding, insisted that the prescribed punishment be applied. Some
versions of this story describe protests from colleagues who urged
mercy, prompting Zaleucus to order that his son lose only one of his
eyes, and that he, Zaleucus, lose one of his as well. The Zaleucus image
was commonplace, found not only in the grandeur of Amsterdam but
in other town halls and elsewhere, reproduced in paintings, in stained
glass windows, and in prints.
The theme that rendering judgment inflicts pain on judges is repeated
in the Judgment of Brutus. Lucius Junius Brutus was, upon the over-
throw of the monarchy in Rome, the first consul of the Roman Republic.
According to the Roman historian Livy, Brutus's two sons joined a con-
spiracy to return the monarchists to Rome. Upon learning of his sons'
treachery, Brutus sentenced them-along with their co-conspirators-
to death.
Thus, a variety of messages about the challenges of doing justice
were proffered. Some served as warnings to judges-threatened with
the risk of life, limb, and skin-if they failed to be honest, or loyal and
subservient to the power of the state. Other scenes demonstrated that
to be the loyal servants of the state, applying its laws, required judges
to inflict pain on themselves. Implicitly, as judges were required to kill
their children, so kings would, at times, have to impose sanctions on
their subjects-but also with pain at having to do so.
A recap of the analyses offered thus far is in order. First, Justice
imagery is a regular feature of today's legal and popular culture in many
parts of the world. Second, we have learned to "read" Justice because
ruling powers (both in pre-democratic states and in democratic govern-
ments) have taught us to do so in an effort to legitimate their judgment,
once sourced in divine right and more recently in popular sovereignty.
Third, rulers wrap themselves more in Justice than in the other virtues
because governments need the power to judge as a means of imposing
control.
Fourth, as we have seen from the last two centuries of Justice images,
they do not (at least on the surface) reflect the weightiness of doing jus-
tice. Rather, the commonplace attributes of today's Justice are taken to
invoke positive utilitarian aspects of what doing justice entails: scales
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to dispense justice evenly; the sword to mark the power to enforce the
verdicts rendered, and, sometimes, a blindfold, suggesting judgment
uncorrupted. Historically, however, far less cheerful images of Justice
were regularly displayed in government buildings, as rulers instructed
both the judges and the judged that the activity was neither painless
for, nor costless to, any of its participants. Yet very little of this lively
and freighted visual tradition has been handed down to us.
Rather (and now on to our fifth point), the complexity has been
mostly washed out. In fact, however, the history of the contemporary
attributes-sword, scales, and blindfold-reveals many meanings, not
all necessarily celebratory as is now assumed. Here, we use the blind-
fold as our example and to do so we return to the Vierschaar of the
Town Hall of Amsterdam.
Across from the painful scenes of Brutus, Zaleucus, and Solomon is
one of the many statues of Justice in the building. But unlike the rest of
the Town Hall's Justices, who are clear-eyed, this Justice is blindfolded.
That blindfold is not, we believe, intended to be interpreted as a cele-
bratory signature, denoting through covered eyes a useful distance.
Rather, we think her eyes are bandaged to keep her from having to see
the pain caused by the sanctions imposed in the name of the law.
Our reading is supported by a brief excursion into the history of
art and of metaphors, which teaches that blindfolding-preventing a
person from seeing-was once intended to signify the profound limita-
tions of any person so encumbered. For example, blindfolds are regu-
larly found on depictions of Synagoga, a figure who represents the Old
Testament, and who was (from the Christian vantage point) "blind" to
the light of Christianity. Through figures 18 and 19, taken of the south
transept portal of the Strasbourg Cathedral in France, one can com-
pare a 1230 rendition of Synagoga (fig. 19), shown blindfolded and
crooked and holding a bent lance, with the female figure of the clear-
eyed Ecclesia (fig. 18), who represents the New Testament; she is
shown ramrod straight and holding an upright long staff.
The negative connotations of the blindfold were brought to bear
on Justice in one of the many woodcuts that illustrated a book, The
Ship of Fools,23 written by Sebastian Brant and dating from the late
1400s. This once immensely popular volume, with some images attrib-
uted to Albrecht Duirer, is full of moral instruction. The illustration of
The Fool Blindfolding Justice (fig. 20) accompanied a chapter entitled
23 For our reading, we have relied on Edwin H. Zeydel, The Ship of Fools by Sebastian
Brant, Translated into Rhyming Couplets with Introduction and Commentary (with Repro-
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"Quarreling and Going to Court." 24 A reader of The Ship of Fools could
have had no doubt of the negativity of blindness for the author, who
repeatedly warned against the "folly, blindness, error, and stupidity of
all stations and kinds of men."z2
24 See chapter 71, in Zeydel's translation, at 236-37. The three lines above the woodcut
are:
He'll get much raillery uncouth,
Who fights like children tooth for tooth,
And thinks that he can blind the truth.
Below the print, the chapter begins:
Now of that fool I would report
Who always wants to go to court,
And amicably end no suit
Before he's had a hot dispute.
When cases would protracted be,
And men from justice hide or flee, ...
The chapter ends with these words:
The man who'd rather sue than eat
Should have some nettles on his seat.
2 Id. at 57, which includes the prologue, translated as follows: "For profit and salutary
instruction, admonition and pursuit of wisdom, reason and good manners: also for contempt
and punishment of folly, blindness, error, and stupidity of all stations and kinds of men: with
special zeal, earnestness, and labor compiled at Basel by Sebastian Brant, doctor in both
laws."
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Another well-known blindfolded Justice comes from a series of Vir-
tues done in the 1550s by Peter Bruegel. In different parts of the pic-
ture, various kinds of punishment (hanging, burning, scourging) are
imposed. Justice, accompanied by a retinue of armed men, holds a
raised sword, carries scales, and is blindfolded. Some commentators
argue that the entire scene offers up a naturalistic and unproblematic
portrayal of the then-ordinary administration of criminal justice. Given
that blindfolded justices were not commonplace in that era, we believe
that, at the least, Bruegel wanted us to focus on the pain of judgment
rather than to celebrate uncritically its application.
In short, the blindfold on these Renaissance Justices is the forerun-
ner of a trope regularly relied upon by contemporary cartoonists and
muckrakers. The cartoon critical of a current Supreme Court Justice
(fig. 3) used a blindfold in this manner. As far as we (and others) 26 have
been able to find, only relatively recently has a blindfold become a more
regular part of Justice iconography and, moreover, a valorized attribute.
That re-reading of this symbol depends on the reconfiguration of the
theory of judging.
That a blindfold could denote judicial impartiality and fair treat-
ment depends on new (e.g., Enlightenment) understandings of judges'
relationship to state authority. As the discussion of Cambyses made
plain, kings once celebrated their power over judges. The ideas of sub-
jecting kingly power to justice and of protecting judges from executive
and legislative incursions are modern ones. In Commonwealth legal
cultures, that principle was established in the 1701 Act of Settlement,
which provided that judges no longer automatically lost their com-
missions as jurists when the monarch who had appointed them left
office.
The positive evaluation of the blindfold on Justice is one of many
examples of symbols whose meanings vary over time and place. Today,
the blindfold is taken to refer to the desirability of deliberately circum-
scribing the knowledge of decision makers. Moreover, because of liter-
ary traditions that link blindness with heightened knowledge derived
from reliance on other senses, artistic plays on Justice's sight can both
denote special powers of Justice and, inferentially, raise the issue of the
complexity of the relationship between knowledge and doing justice.
26 See, e.g., Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the
Renaissance, 109-10 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; first published in 1939); Otto
Rudolf Kissel, Die Justitia: Reflexionen iiber ein Symbol, und seine Darstellung in der bil-
denden Kunst (Justitia: Reflections on a Symbol and its Representation in Sculpture) (Munich:
Beck, 1984); Theodore Ziolkowski, The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal
Crises, 18 and 106 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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As a consequence, and in addition to the mocking deployment of
the blindfold that stretches from the 1494 woodcut The Fool Blind-
folding Justice to contemporary cartoons, one can find artistic inven-
tions around Justice's eyes. A 1778 Joshua Reynolds Justice (for a series
of Virtues in the New College at Oxford, England) has her hand shad-
ing her eyes. A sculpture from the 1990s (fig. 21) by Diana Moore that
was created for a federal courthouse in New Hampshire puts Justice in
the position of blindfolding herself.
To summarize, during the pre-democratic era, the challenges of ren-
dering judgment were visually denoted in major public spaces with reg-
ularity. However, through self-conscious choices of governments over
the last three centuries or so, handless and skinless judges were not
made to adorn our courthouses. Nor can one find many scenes of the
personal pain that judgment imposes on judges. And whatever irony
the blindfold once had-of Justice led astray-has mostly been relegated
to the cartoon pages.
FIGURE 21. Lady Justice. Diana Moore, 1996, Warren B. Rudman, Jr. Federal Court-
house, Concord, New Hampshire. Photographer: Nick Wheeler. Photograph provided by the
architectural firm of Shepley Bulfinch Richardson & Abbott and by the artist and repro-
duced with their permission.
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3. THE TRIUMPH AND THE DEATH OF ADJUDICATION
To bring this discussion forward and to focus on the century just past, we
will advert to but skip a logical next point-about the transition from
the multi-function town halls of the medieval and Renaissance periods
to what are today discrete buildings called courthouses. That saga en-
tails analyses of the expansion of government functions, the growth of
the professions of judges, lawyers, and architects, and the ability, dur-
ing cycles of prosperity, to secure funding for major public buildings.
But we do want to spend a moment exploring how and why the
demand side for justice has risen-resulting in the tens of thousands of
courthouses around the world. As we have thus far made plain, public
displays (spectacles, in some instances) of the fact of judgment and of
adjudication long predate democracy. But the advent of democracy
reshaped adjudication in important ways. During the twentieth cen-
tury, the prospect of seeking justice became plausible for wholly new
sets of claimants.
We highlight here just two of several factors central to the revised
expectations for adjudication. 27 First, democratic theory entrenched the
precepts that governments ought to be subject to and bound by their
own rules and that they ought to treat persons with dignity and re-
spect. To implement that constraint on government, individuals gained
rights to use litigation to call state officials to account. The result has
been an avalanche of claims, ranging from veterans seeking benefits
within administrative tribunals to victims of crimes against humanity
seeking acknowledgment in domestic as well as in international courts
for wrongdoing of horrific dimensions.
Another factor, one that has been under-appreciated in the litera-
ture of courts, is women's rights. We have shown many images of Jus-
tice as a woman, but women only gained full juridical voice in the last
century. The radical reconception of women as rights holders-both in
and outside of their families-has driven up the volume of disputes.
Judicial institutions have proliferated and diversified. The changes
in the United States can quickly be seen through a bar graph and a few
pictures. This simple graph, "Article III Authorized Judgeships" (fig. 22),
maps the growth in the life-tenured federal trial judges in the United
States over one hundred years, from 1901 to 2001. As can be seen, in
1901, about one hundred life-tenured judgeships were commissioned
for all three levels of the federal courts; by 2001, the current number of
authorized slots exceeded 850.
27 Additional discussion can be found in Judith Resnik, "Civil Processes," in The Oxford
Handbook of Legal Studies, 748-72 (Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, eds.; Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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In days of fewer federal filings and fewer federal rights, United States
courthouses were often buildings that included a post office, a few court-
rooms, and sometimes customs offices. Others were dedicated court-
house spaces of three or four floors. The federal courthouse (fig. 23),28
built in 1906 in Grand Forks, North Dakota, is one such solid em-
bodiment. Compare it to a federal courthouse built in 2000, a twenty-
nine-story-tall skyscraper in St. Louis, Missouri (fig. 24),29 as well as to
another, the new federal courthouse in Boston (fig. 25),30 opened in 1998.
These visual embodiments of the importance of adjudication sup-
port a conclusion that, during the twentieth century, adjudication "tri-
umphed"; it became a form of decision making identified as key to
successful market-based economies and as a requirement of politically
legitimate democracies. Further, as nations joined together in regional
federations and in international organizations, they also spawned new
transnational courts.
Inside that Boston courthouse, one finds lovely courtrooms such as
the one depicted in figure 26. Twenty-five trial courts have a similar
appearance, with four equal arches suggesting the equality of all before
28 Our thanks to the Honorable Celeste Bremer, United States Magistrate Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa, and to Janice Dinkel, Judiciary Regional Account Manager, Public
Buildings Service, General Services Administration, Rocky Mountain Region, for helping us
to locate and use figure 23.
29OUr thanks to the Honorable David D. Noce, United States Magistrate Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri, for his assistance in taking and providing us with figure 24.
30 Our thanks to the Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, United States District Court Judge
for the District of Massachusetts, for his assistance in helping us to obtain and reproduce the
photographs in figures 25 and 26.
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FIGURE 23. The Grand Forks Federal and Court Building. Renamed in 2002 the
Ronald N. Davies Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse. Grand Forks, North Dakota.
Architect: James Knox Taylor, 1906. Photographer: Steve Silverman. Copyright: Steve Sil-
verman, www.stevesilvermanimaging.com. Reproduced with the permission of the photog-
rapher and of the building's Property Manager, Bryan Sayler.
the law. But there is a disjuncture between this new building, its court-
rooms, and the rules and practices that now surround federal processes.
Judges are now multi-taskers, sometimes managers of lawyers and
of cases, sometimes mediators, sometimes referral sources, sending people
outside of courts to alternative fora. In the United States and elsewhere,
we have seen a failing faith in adjudicatory procedure, a growth in
anti-adjudicatory rhetoric, and the promotion-by judges and lawyers-
of alternative dispute resolution. Local rules of the Boston federal courts
are illustrative-instructing judges to bring up the topic of settlement
every time that judges meet with lawyers and litigants. 31
One should contemplate the image of the Boston courtroom with the
knowledge that, in the District of Massachusetts in 1998 when this fed-
eral courthouse opened, 142 civil and 48 criminal trials were completed.
31 For further details, see Judith Resnik, "Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Trans-
forming the Meaning of Article 1I1," 113 Harvard Law Review 924 (2000), and Judith
Resnik, " Managerial Judges," 96 Harvard Law Review 376 (1982).
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FIGURE 24. Thomas F. Eagleton Federal Courthouse. St. Louis, Missouri. Archi-
tects: Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum, Inc., 2000. Photographer: The Honorable David D.
Noce, Magistrate Judge of the Eastern District of Missouri. Photograph courtesy of and
reproduced with permission of the photographer.
With twenty-five courtrooms available, the average that year was about
seven to eight trials per courtroom. Of course, trials are not the only
proceeding for which courtrooms are used. But we know from congres-
sionally chartered analyses of courtroom usage that, at least in the loca-
tions studied, federal courtrooms had their "lights on"-meaning lit for
at least two hours in a given day-only about half the time. 32
Yet, as can be seen from the Boston courtroom interior in figure 26,
new courtrooms are not designed as multi-tasking spaces, with easily
32 See U.S. General Accounting Office, "Courthouse Construction: Better Courtroom Use
Data Could Enhance Facility Planning and Decisionmaking," 8-11 (GAO/GGD-97-39, May
1997). Additional criticism of the use of space by the federal judiciary can be found in U.S.
Government Accountability Office, "Federal Courthouses: Rent Increases Due to New Space




FIGURE 25. John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse. Boston, Massachu-
setts. Architect: Harry Cobb, 1998. Photographer: Steve Rosenthal. Copyright: Steve
Rosenthal, 1998. Reproduced with permission.
movable pieces permitting reconfiguration into conference and media-
tion rooms. Instead, twenty-five courtrooms (estimated to cost approx-
imately $1.5 million each) are being built as though trials were still the
centerpiece of the justice system.
The data on trial rates in Boston are not anomalous. In 2004, of one
hundred civil cases filed, a trial was commenced in two. Moreover, as
the chart "Civil and Criminal Trial Rates in U.S. Federal Courts, 1976-
2000" (fig. 27, which was prepared at the behest of a federal appellate
judge concerned about the decline in trials)33 makes plain, trial rates,
both civil and criminal, have been dropping for decades. The shorthand
for this phenomenon in the legal profession is "the vanishing trial."'
34
33 That jurist, the Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, explained his concerns in his essay "So Why Call Them Trial
Judges?" 55 Southern Methodist Law Review 1405 (2002).
34 The American Bar Association funded an initiative that brought a group of scholars
together to work on gathering and analyzing the data. See Mark Galanter, "The Vanishing
Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts," 1 J. Em-
pirical Legal Studies 459 (2004).
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FIGURE 26. Interior of a courtroom, John Joseph Moakley United States Court-
house. Boston, Massachusetts. Architect: Harry Cobb, 1998. Photographer: Steve Rosen-
thal. Copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998. Reproduced with permission.
Thus, concurrent with the narrative of one hundred years of the tri-
umphant expansion of adjudication is another story-one that describes
adjudication in decline or, more dramatically, as dying. In both public
and private sectors, leaders in many countries argue that private out-
comes predicated on the parties' consent are better than those imposed
by judges through public processes applying state-generated regulatory
norms. This worldwide movement is propelled by political and social
forces trumpeting deregulation and privatization and is staffed by law-
yers and other professionals seeking and shaping new markets.
Given the pressure to move outside of public adjudication, the court-
rooms in the Boston and other federal courthouses become themselves
symbolic. They stand large and empty, turning into visual relics of a sys-
tem now in disuse. Indeed, a few years ago, when speaking with a group
of judges from several midwestern states, we raised questions about the
continued building of such courtrooms. Several judges were defensive-
insisting that courtrooms, and especially imposing ones, were very useful.
Those judges explained that they brought litigants into courtrooms as
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FIGURE 27
part of their effort to convince litigants to settle their cases. The court-
room was praised for its in terrorem effect: the embodiment of what
disputants are told to fear and to avoid. Courtrooms could thus be
understood as the modern-day version of the Cambyses story. But no
longer is the corrupt judge flayed alive. Rather, it is the litigants, pun-
ished if daring to insist on trial instead of agreeing to settle.
Another problem with major courthouse building can be seen by look-
ing at figure 28, which compares two sets of judges. The shorter col-
umn shows the total number of authorized federal judgeships who sit
inside federal courthouses like those in Boston and St. Louis. Included
are those judges with life tenure appointed through the constitutionally
prescribed processes of Article III and those judges, called magistrate
and bankruptcy judges, who, by virtue of congressional statutes, are
selected by life-tenured judges and chartered for fixed and renewable
terms. 35 That total number, roughly 1,650, can be contrasted with the
higher column representing the administrative law judges and hearing
officers who number about 4,750, work in agencies, and hold their
positions by virtue of statutes that create administrative adjudication.
35 See 28 U.S.C. SS 151, 152 (bankruptcy judges), and 5§ 631-636 (magistrate judges).
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Number of Authorized Judgeships in Article III
Federal Courts and in Federal Agencies (as of 2002)
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As the next graph, providing an "Estimate of Evidentiary Proceed-
ings in Article III Courts and in Four Federal Agencies" (fig. 29) makes
plain, the number of evidentiary hearings in federal agencies is more
than fivefold the number of evidentiary hearings in federal courthouses
such as those depicted in St. Louis and Boston. Looking at data from
2001 and considering four federal agencies (the Social Security Admin-
istration, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, the Im-
migration Service, and the Veterans Administration), the volume of events
in which witnesses testify is greater outside the federal courts than
inside. The point here is that while trials are vanishing in the federal
courts, they are also migrating into agencies that have become, func-
tionally, another set of courts. Moreover, adjudication has been "out-
sourced" not only to agencies but also to the private sector. We cannot
depict the volume or shape of such proceedings because no good data
are available about their dimensions.
36
4. ADJUDICATION AND DEMOCRACY
We move now toward our conclusions, and to do so we delineate the
different critiques and questions that emerge from the discussion of
contemporary courthouse building. A first set of issues can be clustered
under the question, why are we building major new courthouses at all?
Despite the cutting-edge construction techniques and abstract paint-
ings, many new courthouses, centered on their courtrooms, are both
old fashioned and dysfunctional.
Even more troubling, one might read the buildings as gestures seek-
ing to instill a sense of legitimacy to state-based processes by making it
seem as if trials were a major modality and thereby rendering the pre-
dominance of the alternatives to trial less visible. From a more positive
vantage point (if you are, as we are, skeptical of some forms of alter-
native dispute resolution), one could interpret the ongoing building as
evidence of the deep ambivalence that government leaders have about
their own promotion of settlement and privatization in lieu of public
processes.
A related question focuses on the maldistribution of public funds. We
have provided no pictures of the office buildings or small rooms in which
agency decision making takes place, but such facilities are quite often
cramped and tucked away. Amsterdam's Town Hall and the courthouses
3' For further details, see Judith Resnik, "Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The
Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts," 1 J. Empirical Legal
Studies 783 (2004), and Judith Resnik, "Whither and Whether Adjudication?" 86 Boston
University Law Review 1101 (2006).
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in Boston and St. Louis invite passersby to enter. In contrast, no one
walking down a street could easily happen upon a hearing held in an
agency and decide, spontaneously, to attend. Through regulations, prac-
tices, and custom, what occurs in agency adjudication is generally not
readily accessible to either the public or the media. Better spaces are
needed to enable access to adjudication based in agencies, where tens
of thousands of ordinary disputants go to resolve their disputes.
The relative impoverishment and inaccessibility of agency adjudi-
cation and the utter invisibility of dispute resolution processes in the
private sector enable us to answer the question we raised earlier, about
whether to build courthouses at all. The tradition of public observances
of judgments (such as those rendered in Amsterdam) did not come
from modern conceptions of accountable and transparent government.
Rather, historically, many practices of public judgment were ritualized
displays of power that were "rites" for members of the public, situated
as observers with no ability to make demands on the state. In contrast,
in common-law systems with juries, eligible members of the public did
have participatory obligations to serve as decision makers.
But because the processes were public, rulers could not always con-
tain their effects. The consequences ranged from uncontrollable crowds
(as Foucault famously recounted)3 7 to the generation of new informa-
tion that brought knowledge to the public domain. Over time, as com-
mitments to democracy grew, the public gained "rights" of audience and
the ability to demand access, information, and accountability. Today's
constitutions and transnational conventions ensure "open" and "pub-
lic" courts as these attributes have themselves become representations
of the meaning of adjudication in democracies, and adjudication in turn
has become a signature feature of democracy.
Open courts are one of many venues that today create the public
sphere, enabling exchanges among various segments of a polity and
thereby creating participatory opportunities for norms to be constituted,
affirmed, or reconfigured. The public processes of courts permit educa-
tion, a point made centuries ago by Jeremy Bentham, who called courts
"school[s] of the highest order."' 38
But in the interval since Bentham wrote, courts have come to do a
good deal more. Given twentieth-century developments of equal treat-
ment of humans, courts are one place in which power can be redistrib-
37 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan, trans.;
New York: Vintage Books, 1977; 2nd ed., 1995).38 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham 355 (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843,
vol. 6) (reprinting Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 1827, vol. 1).
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uted. Individuals have entitlements to call governments to account, pub-
licly, for wrongdoing. However powerful they may be when outside
courts, when private-sector and public-sector actors come into court,
they become subject to rules that oblige them to exchange information
and to treat their opponents fairly. In many respects, they must operate
as equals of their adversaries. (The importance of such obligations can
be seen in efforts to avoid them, as in the United States today, where
the Executive branch has tried repeatedly to "strip" jurisdiction from
the federal courts over claims of wrongdoing brought by detainees in
Guantanamo and elsewhere.)39
In short, and as argued at more length elsewhere, 40 courts are one
place in which to insist on equal treatment or to witness the failure to
accord it. Courts undermine the state's monopoly on power and forge
community ownership of norms. Moreover, courts make good on another
democratic promise: that rules can change because of popular input.
Through the democratic iterations of a multitude of cases, witnessed
by a motley crew of spectators, conflict about or convergence on law
can emerge. That is an argument for continuing to construct separate
and discrete buildings-courthouses.
This response, in turn, prompts consideration of another set of ques-
tions, about whether courthouses "ought" to be identifiable in form so
as not to be confused with other major buildings. Further, should they
be distinctive reflections of the particularities of a given country? These
questions have an immediacy, as the spurt in courthouse construction
is by no means limited to the United States. Many countries are in-
volved in courthouse building, with architects competing for design
commissions. Moreover, some buildings are explained as representing
a particular nation's identity. For example, the architects who designed
the 1992 Supreme Court in Jerusalem for the State of Israel described
their goal as seeking to reflect the "special nature of justice and tradi-
tions in Israel."'41 France has undertaken an ambitious project of con-
struction in more than twenty sites, 42 and other important buildings
span the globe, from Melbourne, Australia, to Helsinki, Finland.
39 See, e.g., The Military Commission Act of 2006, Public L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified at various sections of 10 U.S.C. § 948 et seq., and at 28 U.S.C. 5 2241).
40Judith Resnik and Dennis E. Curtis, "From 'Rites' to 'Rights' of Audience: The Utilities
and Contingencies of the Public's Role in Court-Based Processes," in Representations of
Justice (Antoine Masson and Kevin O'Connor, eds.; Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, forthcoming,
2007).
41 See Yosef Sharon, The Supreme Court Building, Jerusalem at 25 (Alexandra Mahler,
trans.; Israel: Yad Hanadiv, 1993, 2nd ed. 1997).
42 See La Nouvelle Architecture Judiciaire: Des Palais de justice Modernes Pour Une Nou-
velle Image de la justice (France: La Documentation Franqaise, 2000). Such work is centered
in the offices of the Agence de Maitrise d'Ouvrage des Travaux du Ministýre de la Justice.
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FIGURE 30. European Court of Human Rights. Strasbourg, France. Architect: Rich-
ard Rogers, 1984. Photographer: Sandro Weltin. Image provided and reproduced with the
assistance of the photographer and with the permission of the Council of Europe.
In contrast to these nation-specific courts is the 1984 building (fig.
30)43 of the European Court of Human Rights, whose jurisdiction crosses
the boundaries of nation-states as it develops aspects of the law of a
federated Europe. That court joins some old transnational courts (such
as the International Court of Justice, convening on the site of the
"Peace Palace," which opened in The Hague in 1913 after a major com-
petition among architects) and others, now housed in new buildings,
such as that of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
opened in 2000 in Hamburg, Germany. (The International Criminal
Court [ICC] is currently in temporary quarters as state parties consider
whether to proceed with a building.)
Many of the new buildings, like the federal courthouse in Boston
(depicted above, in fig. 24) are clad in glass. Looking at the exterior and
interior glass, one might be tempted to conclude that glass-and the
transparency it permits-is the new symbol of justice. But a vocabulary
of transparency, with the expanse and expense of glass that it supports,
is not unique to contemporary courthouses. Rather, it is an artifact of
technological advances of the last century and can be found in many
43 Our thanks to the Honorable Lucius Wildhaber, former President of this Court, and to
John Darcy, a lawyer staff member of that Court, for helping us to obtain this image.
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kinds of buildings.44 Indeed, proponents of a new baseball stadium in
Washington, D.C., have also insisted that glass will be essential, for (as
they were quoted in newspapers as explaining) baseball too must con-
vey "the transparency of democracy."'
45
One issue is whether to aspire to a particular aesthetic, insistent
upon the notion that courts have a distinctive look. Should we be trou-
bled if a viewer sees a court but does not know it, mistaking the build-
ing for a museum, a factory, or a mall? A new court in Helsinki is in
fact a recycled liquor factory. In Sydney, another is a renovated old de-
partment store, with faded words like "corsets" and "gloves" still leg-
ible on its facade. Another question is whether courts should aspire to
have a national identity, looking different from one another because
one is in Australia, another in Israel, a third in France.
Our position is that the sine qua non of courthouse buildings should
be their accessibility to the public. Those with the power to commis-
sion new court buildings ought to select sites easily reached by public
transportation and proximate to other services and to use buildings
housing other government functions. In the United States, for example,
the federal courts in many cities were in the same building as the post
office. While both courts and post offices now need more space, multi-
purpose venues welcome a wider range of users than does a space ded-
icated to only one use. Responsive to this very concern, the Federal
Courthouse in Boston now convenes educational events for children and
adults as it seeks to continue to serve, as county courthouses around
the United States once did, as a community center.
As for whether these structures ought to be marked to reflect dis-
tinctive national identities, answers come in part from the functions of
courthouses. The unique service provided-adjudication-is not partic-
ular to place. Rather, adjudication's norms of equal treatment, fair hear-
ings, and public transparency are either transnational or a-national. Fur-
ther, many countries have determined that their jurists ought to be in
dialogue with judges elsewhere. An example comes from Article 39 of
the Constitution of South Africa. That provision requires that, when in-
terpreting that nation's bill of rights, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa "must consider international law" and may consider foreign
law. As the 1996 Constitution's preamble explained, South Africa was
establishing "a society predicated on democratic values, social justice
44 See Annette Fierro, The Glass State: The Technology of the Spectacle: Paris, 1981-1998
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003).
45 David Nakamura, "Architects Promise Visionary D.C. Ballpark: HOK Sport Considers
Such Encompassing Themes as 'Transparency in Democracy' for Design," Washington Post,
1 April 2005, at B1.
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and fundamental human rights" so as to take "its rightful place as a
sovereign state in the family of nations."'46
Atop the exchange of views about the shape of human rights, another
idea-that of universal jurisdiction transcending geography-is increas-
ingly asserted by some countries as well as by bodies like the Interna-
tional Criminal Court as a legitimate response to certain kinds of harms.
Under that theory, courts have the power to indict individuals outside
the nations in which a particular court sits. If national boundaries
decreasingly define a court's jurisdiction and if transnational documents
(including several United Nations covenants) express shared commit-
ments to public processes, fair treatment, and judicial independence,
the buildings that are courts will share features reflective of the trans-
nationalization of both law and adjudication.
A transnational idiom for courts is not, however, an approach that
is specifically modern. The town halls of various city-states in Europe
had a good deal in common with each other, as they displayed an ico-
nography influenced by Ripa, whose work traveled from Italy through
and beyond Northern Europe. Moreover, "European" emblems, such
as the scales used so widely to evoke the act of judgment, are not spe-
cifically European, but rather can be traced to non-European cultures
in Africa and the Middle East. A shared vocabulary and overlapping
images about judgment have long spanned many cultures and derived
from a host of crossings, some of them via colonizing powers that them-
selves moved both east and west, both north and south.
Finally, we return to the questions of symbolic representation with
which we began. As governments dedicate spaces to justice and aspire
to some didacticism along the way, what content ought to be conveyed?
Our conclusion is that the contemporary glowing expressions of power,
authority, privilege, and legitimacy rarely do justice to justice. We have
documented the iconography surrounding justice but, to be clear, we
have not done so in an effort to romanticize that history.
Our visual traditions of Justice have their political roots in states that
were hierarchical, non-democratic, and tolerant of profound inequalities.
Most people for most of the time were outside the circle of rights and of
power. It is therefore not surprising that the icons of Justice that have come
down to us signal little about access to justice or about rights-seeking.
(A more complex question is why, with the rise of democracy, so much
about the pain and conflict entailed in imposing justice was washed out.)
For us, the precepts of good democratic governance as encoded
and iterated in the symbolism of Justice are far too narrow. Hence, we
close with four suggestions. First, to the extent we harken back to Renais-





F I G U RE 31. Front facade of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Johannes-
burg, South Africa. Architects: Jamina Masojada, Andrew Makin, OMM Design Workshop,
and Paul Wygers, Urban Solutions, 2004. Photographer: Angela Buckland. Copyright: Con-
stitutional Court Trust, 2005. Reproduced courtesy of the Constitutional Court Trust and
David Krut Publishing.
sance iconography, we need to enlarge the focus. Justice was once part
of a foursome. We would be better served were our leadership to see
itself in need of Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance as much as in
need of the power of Justice. Imagine courts adorned with bridles to
symbolize restraint, mirrors to evoke the need for self-awareness, and
broken columns to show strength and endurance. Moreover, one could
retrieve Justice's cornucopia (an attribute that was lost in late medieval
times) and drop the sword, borrowed from the iconography of Arch-
angel Michael, portrayed as slaying a satanic dragon.
For the second suggestion, a visual visit to the Constitutional Court
of South Africa, discussed above, is required. Figure 31 provides an-
other court facade, by now somewhat familiar,47 yet with an important
47 Our thanks to Justice Albie Sachs of the South African Constitutional Court and to
former Yale Law students Elizabeth Brundige and Maria Burnett for assistance in obtaining
the images shown in figures 31 and 32.
JUDITH RESNIK AND DENNIS E. CURTIS
FIGURE 32. Interior Courtyard,
Old Fort Prison, within the
Constitutional Complex of South Africa.
Johannesburg, South Africa. Photographer:
Angela Buckland. Copyright: Constitutional
Court Trust, 2005. Reproduced courtesy
of the Constitutional Court Trust and
David Krut Publishing.
variation in that many languages are used on the front to welcome
speakers of different tongues. But, in addition to foyers and courtrooms,
one can see barbed wire and empty jail cells (fig. 32). This Constitu-
tional Complex was built on the Old Fort Jail, where Nelson Mandela
was a prisoner. According to Mandela, President of South Africa when
this design was selected, its purpose is to incorporate "horrid memories
of torture and suffering," in part to honor the struggle for freedom and
in part with the confidence that these practices would not be resumed. 48
48 Taryn Lamberti, "Mandela Names Winning Architects," Business Day (South Africa),
9 April 1998, at 4.
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In so far as we have ascertained, this
is the rare contemporary court building
insistent on expressing something about in-
justice going forth in the name of the state.
(A predecessor can be found after another
revolutionary moment when, in 1941, Jos6
Clemente Orozco painted murals in the
then-new building for the Supreme Court
of Mexico. There depicted is a Justice, lying
far back in her throne, a sword dangling
by her side, as injustice oppresses people
below her feet.) 49
Third, something about the pain of giv-
ing judgment-retrieving the themes of
Zaleucus (rather than Brutus)-is needed,
as is illustrated by figure 33,50 a wooden
figure described sometimes as a Lord of
Jurisprudence. According to some com-
mentators, this wooden African figure is
full of nails because of the pain and bur-
dens of judging that he carries on his chest.
Others say that community rituals require
that nails be driven in when judgments are
accepted. Yet others argue that this is not
a justice figure at all.
We show it here to demonstrate that
objects can be used to express something
of the weight, the difficulty, and the pain
of judgment-both in the making of judg-
ments and in the acceptance of them. Yet
few of the courthouses we have seen admit
or display the burdens and obligations of
judgment-for either judges or litigants.
FIGURE 33. Nail figure.
Kongo, artist unknown,
circa 1875-1900.
Copyright: The Detroit Institute
of Arts, Founders Society
Purchase, Eleanor Clay
Ford Fund for African Art.
Reproduced with permission.
49 See Nation's Supreme Court of Justice: Federal Judiciary: Integration and Operation of
the Federal Judiciary, Retrospective: Mexico, 66-67 (Mexico [published for the Court],
1997). The Court's monograph described the two sections related to Justice, with one section
representing "metaphysical justice fulminating the evil, and on the other, men['s] justice pun-
ishing them." The imagery of a "blindfolded Justice in a compromising position" apparently
distressed some government leaders sufficiently that another, more "constructive," set of
murals (about the "fertility of peace" as contrasted with the "horror of war") by George
Biddle of the United States was installed. See "Orozco v. Biddle," Time Magazine, 24 Sep-
tember 1945, at 46.
-
0This figure was identified by Robert Farris Thompson in Perspectives: Angles on Afri-
can Art, 181 (1987) as a "standing image of what might be called a lord of jurisprudence."
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FIGURE 34. Cook County Courthouse. Grand Marais, Minnesota. Architects: Kelly
and Lighell, circa 1900-24. Photographer: Doug Ohman, Pioneer Photography. Copyright:
Doug Ohman. Reproduced with permission.
Our fourth suggestion takes us to two last images of what we found
in a county court in Northern Minnesota, in a town called Grand Ma-
rais. Figure 34 offers a view of the facade of this multi-purpose court-
house, constructed at the beginning of the twentieth century. Today, it
continues to serve many functions, as do government buildings in small
towns around the United States. We arrived unannounced but found a
probation officer who offered to give us a tour. When we inquired
about what (if any) icons of justice were displayed, he did not hesitate
to bring us to the courtroom in which a shabby corduroy jacket, shown
in figure 35, had proudly been framed. Our guide explained that this
was a memorial to a local lawyer who had provided free services to
criminal defendants. The plaque celebrates a person committed to the
"human dignity of others," and specifically "the poor," in need of but
without the resources to seek justice.
These closing examples suggest but a few of the ways to invoke the
challenges of democratic justice in the twenty-first century-in terms of
making justice accessible to a host of claimants, of remembering and
acknowledging the injustice that has gone forth in the name of legiti-
mate state power, of the burden and the weight that giving judgment
entails, and of understanding that Justice, if the only attribute of gov-
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FIG URE 35. James Sommerness Memorial. Cook County Courthouse, Grand Marais,
Minnesota. Photographer: Glenn Gilyard. Reproduced with the permission of Richard Gil-
yard, who served as the architect for the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and who
arranged for the picture to be taken.
ernment, comes to be reduced to power rather than working as one
facet of a set of programs and actions that would constitute good gov-
ernance. Entailed herein are not only acts of memory-reclaiming the
stories of justice and injustice from the past-but also a vision that
democratic justice is not simply continuous with the practices of adju-
dication predating democracy but also entails substantial departures.
To represent justice today requires devising ways to acknowledge what
democracy brings to adjudication: new and genuinely radical commit-
ments of trying to make more available the forms of earthly justice that
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